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REGULATION OF Bus1NEss-TnADE REsTRAINTs-BusINEss ProcE AND UsE
RESTRICTIONS AccoMPANYING SALE OF LAND-Plaintiff, a wholesale and retail
dealer in "Marathon" products, and the smallest wholesale distributor of gasoline
in Ann Arbor, sought to enjoin defendant from selling Marathon gasoline at less
than the price set under the provisions of the standard dealer's contract. Defendant
bad acquired his station by a deed containing a covenant expressly intended to run
with the land, providing for the operation of a :6.lling station on the land, and a tenyear agreement that ~II petroleum products sold on the premises were to be supplied
by plaintiff "at such prices and on such terms as are customarily furnished to
other dealers in like products in the Ann Arbor, Michigan, area.'' The customary
dealer's contract contained a provision for setting resale prices, the dealer to follow the price set at plaintiff's retail station, which in turn was set to meet competitors' lowest price. Relying on defendant's promise to sign such a contract,
plaintiff installed equipment to be loaned under its terms and delivered an initial order of gasoline. Defendant refused to sign the contract, objecting to the
uniform price clause, and started to sell gasoline at less than the going price.
Held, decree for injunction affirmed. The price-fixing clause was a part of a
covenant running with the land and was not a violation of the Michigan antitrust act of 18991 since it constituted a reasonable restraint of trade. Staebler
Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, Inc., (Mich. 1951) 45 N.W. (2d) 316.

1

Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §445.701, Mich. Stat. Ann. §28.31.
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Both at common law and under the Michigan equivalent of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act, the Michigan Supreme Court has taken the position that contracts fixing prices are per se unreasonable and therefore void.2 The principal case
seems to be a departure from this view insofar as it holds that an agreement controlling resale prices may be sustained as a reasonable restraint of trade. Apparently the court finds justification for its holding in the fact that the agreement
was not an ordinary contract, but rather a covenant running with the land.3 The
court reasons that the agreement was not primarily designed to control prices,
but was an agreement for the sale of land containing incidental restrictions on
the use of the land dictated by a "fair and compelling" business purpose. The distinction, particularly in the face of a contrary decision on almost identical facts in
Mulliken v. Naph-Sol Refining Company,4 is hard to grasp,15 and the decision
completely ignores the problems involved in deciding whether or not a covenant
runs with the land. 6 Real covenants are created only when the traditional re2 Richarclson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632, 43 N.W. 1102 (1899); Hunt v. Riverside Cooperative Club, 140 Mich. 538, 104 N.W. 40 (1905); W. H. Hill Co. v. Grey and
Worchester, 163 Mich. 12, 127 N.W. 803, 30 A.L.R. 10 (1910); Mulliken v. Naph-Sol
Refining Co., 302 Mich. 410, 4 N.W. (2d) 707 (1942). But see Peppen, "Price-Fixing
Agreements," 28 CALIP. L. REv. 297 (1940) in which it is asserted that no common law
authority exists for the proposition that agreements directly fixing prices are per se unlawful. Professor Peppen indicates that the Richardson case was dependent on a finding of
control of the match market and distinguished the Hunt case by showing that it was
decided after and influenced by Judge Taft's erroneous analysis of the common law set
forth in United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., (6th Cir. 1898) 85 F. 271, to the
effect that all non-ancillary restraints of trade were illegal per se at common law. This
reasoning was accepted by the Michigan court in areas other than price fixing, Clark v.
Needham, 125 Mich. 84, 83 N.W. 1027 (1900) (non-ancillary agreement not to compete
held void as illegal restraint of trade). The state courts are split on the question of resale
price setting: 7 A.L.R. 449; 19 A.L.R. 449; 32 A.L.R. 1087, 103 A.L.R. 1342, 125 A.L.R.
1335. The general rule under the federal law is in accord with the Michigan cases; see
Peppen, "Price Fixing Agreements under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law," 28 CALIP. L.
REv. 667 (1940); Clay, "Resale Price Maintenance," 16 KY. L.J. 28 (1927).
3 This note will not deal with the problems of construction inherent in terming this
agreement a covenant running with the land.
4 302 Mich. 410, 4 N.W. (2d) 707 (1942). The case involved an oral agreement
between lessor and lessee permitting the lessee a stipulated gross margin of profit on gasoline
sold by lessee; action was brought by the lessee when lessor raised wholesale prices but
refused to allow the full margin agreed upon for the retail price. The court assumed that
the agreement was void under the doctrine of Hunt v. Riverside Club, supra note 2,
holding resale price fixing illegal per se under the Michigan act, but said that even if the
arrangement was 11 part of the lease, a lease is only a contract that would be void if contrary
to public policy.
15 Some justification for this is found in the traditional distinction between ancillary
and non-ancillary contracts set forth in United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Company, supra note 2. The same distinction is made by the Montana court in a case cited in
the principal opinion, Quinlivan v. Brown Oil Co., 96 Mont. 147, 29 P. (2d) 374 (1934),
involving an exactly parallel fact situation except that the agreement was part of a lease
arrangement: the court said that the object of the agreement was the leasing of a gas
station and that the price fix was merely incidental.
6 It is fairly clear from the facts that the court did not have to call the agreement a
covenant running with the land in order to find that defendant was bound by it; although
it was understood that the agreement was to be put in writing, there had already been
partial performance by the plaintiff induced intentionally by defendant.
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quirements of language, intent, privity, and nature (the covenant must "touch
and concern" the land) are met.7 Moreover, it has often been asserted that affirmative covenants cannot run with the land, 8 although the exceptions to this rule
have grown so numerous that it is generally recognized that affirmative covenants
do run in many instances and that some other explanation of the cases is needed.9
One distinction has been made between covenants which benefit and those which
burden the land; it is said that the benefit will run with the land but the
burden will not unless the grantor owns other land in the vicinity which will be
benefited by the enforcement of the covenant.10 The writers also distinguish
real covenants enforceable at law, which must meet the requirement of privity,
and equitable servitudes, which run with respect to any person having notice. 11
The principal covenant is both affirmative and burdensome, but the facts indicate
that plaintiff owned land which could be found to be benefitted by the execution
of the agreement and that defendant had notice of the restriction. Agreements
classified as equitable servitudes are usually in the nature of restrictions on the
use of the land, such as private building and zoning agreements,12 and it is into
this category that the agreement in the principal case fits. But the courts have
made it clear that even these restrictions will not run without meeting the condition that the agreement must affect the land.13 Nor will they be enforced when
their provisions are contrary to the public policy as conceived at common law
or expressed by the legislature. 14 Thus the decision in the principal case depends
See Cr.Ami:, CoVENANTs AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 92-143 (1947).
BThis distinction originated in Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143
(1848). See 41 A.L.R. 1363; 51 A.L.R. 1326. The history of the doctrine is traced in
Sims, "The Law of Real Covenants; Exceptions to the Restatement of the American Law
Institute," 30 CoRN. L.Q. 1 (1944).
9 Affirmative covenants can run in Michlgan: Mueller v. Bankers Trust Co. of Muskegon, 262 Mich. 53, 247 N.W. 103 (1933). See 102 A.L.R. 781, 118 A.L.R. 982; 47
YALE L.J. 821 (1938); Lloyd, ''Enforcement of Affirmative Agreements Respecting the
Use of Land," 14 VA. L. RBv. 419 (1928).
10 5 PROPERTY RBsTATBMBNT §§537, 542, 543, 548 (1940); Rundell, "Judge Clark
on the American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants," 53 YALE L.J. 312 (1944);
WALSH, EQmTY 465 (1930). The reason for the rule is that a provision operating as a
burden on the land violates the policy against restraints on alienation, Walsh, "Covenants
Running with the Land," 21 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. RBv. 28 (1946). The Restatement position
has been severely criticized by writers who believe that burdens should run regardless of
the existence of dominant and subservient tenements: Sims, "The Law of Real Covenants:
Exception to the Restatement of the Subject by the American Law Institute," 30 CoRN.
L.Q. 1 (1944); CLARK, CoVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 137-143 (1947);
Clark, "The American Law Institute's Law of Real Covenants," 52 YALE L.J. 699 (1943);
Clark, "A Note on Professor Rundell's Comment," 53 YALE L.J. 327 (1944).
llCLARK, CoVBNANTs AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 170-186 (1947); Reno,
''The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 VA. L. RBv. 951, 1067 (1942).
12 Agreements restricting certain groups from using residential property are typical;
such agreements are valid in Michigan, 42 MICH. L. RBv. 923 (1944).
13 Reno, ''The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land," 28 VA. L. RBv. 951,
1067 (1942); Gavit, "Covenants Running with the Land," 24 ILL. L. RBv. 786 (1930).
14 Judge Clark points out that the problem with respect to business arrangements is
not one of the validity of the covenant as such, but of public policy against monopolies,
COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 105, n. 38 (1947).
7
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on two questionable assumptions: first, that the agreement, including the fixing
of resale prices, concerns the land in a manner sufficient to cause it to run with
the land,15 and second, that it does not impose an illegal restraint of trade under
the Michigan statute and interpretive cases.16 A first estimate would indicate
that these difficulties could have been avoided merely by applying the Michigan
Fair Trade Act,17 which, under authority applicable at the time the principal
case was decided, sanctioned the control of the resale price of trademarked
articles whenever sold by anyone having notice of the stipulated price and using
the brand name.18 It has been contended that these acts may not be applicable
to price-fixing agreements in an industry, such as the gasoline industry, in which
it is argued that a "monopoly" price is obtained by a price leadership system,
because they require that the article must be in "fair and open competition with
commodities of a like class produced by others" ;19 in any case, the courts did not
consider the Fair Trade Act. Conflicting policy considerations placed the court
in the unenviable position of deciding between protecting a small wholesaler
who can, alone, do nothing to affect prices, but who could conceivably meet
financial disaster as a result of a price war, and giving legal sanction to a device
which can be used to aid the maintenance of an oligopolistic system and a
monopoly price. The decisi<?n to apply a "rule of reason" to price fixing is likely
to produce serious problems for the court, and obviously makes the Michigan
law highly unpredictable.
Jean Engstrom, S.Ed.
15 Agreements were held to be personal in Wiggons v. Ferry Co. v. 0. and M. Ry.
Co., 94 ID. 83 (1879) (agreement to use grantor's ferry to transport cars) and Dickey v.
Kansas Ry., 122 Mo. 223, 26 S.W. 685 (1894) (agreement to provide grantor with a
perpetual free pass on the railroad to be built on the land), but in Smith v. Gulf Refining
Co., 162 Ga. 191, 134 S.E. 446, 51 A.L.R. 1323 (1923) an agreement to buy all gasoline
used on the premises from grantor was held to be a covenant running with the land. This
result was criticized in a note on the case in 4 Wxs. L. Rnv. 125 (1927); the principal case
can be distinguished in that no uniform price clause was involved in the Gulf case. Professor Gavit points out that the real issue is whether or not the "parties interest in the real
estate is one of the operative facts necessary to give validity of lawful performability to
the contract," "Covenants Running with the Land," 24 ILL. L. Rnv. 786 (1930); his
analysis indicates that the fact that the contract in the principal case could and does in
some instances operate independently of any transfer of land is evidence that the agreement is personal; contra, Quinlivan v. Brown Oil Co., supra note 5.
1 6 Accord, Quinlivan v. Brown Oil Co., supra note 5; State ex rel. Hamilton v. Standard Oil Co., 190 Wash. 493, 68 P. (2d) 1031 (1937); contra, Marathon Oil Co. v.
Hadly, (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 107 S.W. (2d) 883.
17Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §445.151, Mich. Stat. Ann. §19.321.
18 49 limv. L. Rnv. 811 (1936); 50 HARv. L. Rnv. 667 (1937); Caliman, "Fair
Trade and Anti-Trust Law," 10 Umv. P:rrr. L. Rnv. 443 (1949); 103 A.L.R. 1342; 125
A.L.R. 1338. But this authority has been superseded by Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., (U.S. 1951) 71 S.Ct. 745, decided after the final decision in the principal
case, and holding that tlie Fair Trade Acts can be applied only to those who are parties to
resale price contracts.
1 9 Caliman, "Fair Trade and Anti-Trust Law,'' 10 Umv. Prrr. L. REv. 443 (1949).
On the mechanics of the maintenance of monopoly prices in this manner see Comer, "Price
Leadership,'' 7 I.Aw AND CoNTBM. PROB. 61 (1940); CHAMBERLIN, THEORY oF MoNOPOLISTic CoMPE'ITI'ION 50n (1948).

